Contenuti per la categoria: Libertà di coscienza e di religione, individuale e collettiva

SOMMARIO: 1. La retromarcia da ingranare (ovvero: il ripensamento circa l’opportunità di trasferire interamente la tutela dei diritti di libertà fondamentali dall’attività parlamentare a quella giurisprudenziale in senso lato) – 2. La ristrutturazione da avviare (ovvero: la ridistribuzione delle competenze in materia di pubblico intervento a garanzia dei diritti di libertà in materia religiosa) – 3. Il dato da cui muovere (ovvero: la metamorfosi della domanda di libertà in materia religiosa nei sistemi liberaldemocratici).

SOMMARIO: La prima sentenza della Corte Europea dei Diritti Umani del 3 novembre 2009 - Le reazioni in Italia dopo la prima sentenza della Corte di Strasburgo - La sentenza di riesame davanti alla Grande Camera della Corte Europea dei Diritti Umani del 18 marzo 2011 - Le condizioni per mantenere la legittimità dell’esposizione del crocifisso nella scuola statale.

SOMMAIRE: 1. Introduction – 2. Les contraintes de conventionalité et la liberté étatique dans l’organisation de l’environnement scolaire: une articulation délicate pour les symboles religieux – 2.1. La soumission de l’aménagement de l’environnement scolaire à un minimum de contraintes de conventionalité – 2.2. La diversité européenne, source d’une large marge d’appréciation au profit des États – 3. Le principe conventionnel de neutralité: entre acrobaties jurisprudentielles et affaiblissement substantiel – 3.1. La minoration contestable de l’impact des crucifix exposés dans les salles de classe – 3.2. Que reste-t-il du principe de neutralité religieuse en matière scolaire? – 4. La portée du revirement.

ABSTRACT: In a particularly sensitive context, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has finally decided to reverse the solution adopted by the Chamber about the famous case Lautsi v. Italy (ECtHR, 2nd Sect. November 3, 2009, Lautsi v. Italy , Appl. No. 30814/06 – ADL’s November 3, 2009). By a majority of fifteen votes against two, the Grand Chamber refuses to condemn Italy for the presence of crucifixes in classrooms of its schools. Receptive to criticism of the solution in 2009, the Court decided to grant broad freedom to States regarding the presence of religious symbols in the school environment. But doing so, she carries out some acrobatics reasoning and reduces principle of neutrality. Lautsi v. Italy , Appl. No. 30814/06 – ADL’s November 3, 2009). By a majority of fifteen votes against two, the Grand Chamber refuses to condemn Italy for the presence of crucifixes in classrooms of its schools. Receptive to criticism of the solution in 2009, the Court decided to grant broad freedom to States regarding the presence of religious symbols in the school environment. But doing so, she carries out some acrobatics reasoning and reduces principle of neutrality.

SUMMARY: 1. Introduction – 2. Relation-Collaboration between the State and Churches in Constitutional Democracies – 3. The laicité à la française Tested by a Deprivatised Religious Process – 3.1. The French Rigid Secularism. Freedom (of Religion) through the State – 4. Canada’s Open Secularism. The Question of Religious-Based Family Law Disputes – 4.1 Reasonable Accommodation and “New” Religious Nomoi Groups – 5. Collaboration-Relation between the State and Churches in Italy – 5.1. The Italian Secularism Tested by the New “Religious Geography” – 6. Conclusion.

ABSTRACT: Under the pressing process of immigration and globalisation many Western constitutional democracies have moved from a number of religions, sharing a common culture, to today's age of diversity. As opposed to the past, the current democracies are facing the lack of overlapping consensus over the basic constitutional laws: namely, the meaning and the scope of freedom of religion, secularism, the separation Church-State, equal treatment and the rule of law. This is because individuals often come to adopt their basic values by very different ways. The nature, scope and force of such values are likely to be affected by competing and, sometimes, contested fundamental values and worldviews. From here stems the pressing tension – or dilemma – between “unity” and “diversity”. This essay starts with general considerations about the freedom of religion principle, strictly related with the “separation” as well as “collaboration” between secular States and Churches; then the author analyses three case-studies (France, Canada and Italy), pointing out some specific legal approaches. In particular he focuses the analyses over the French “droit commun”, the Italian ecclesiastic law and the Canadian arbitral tribunals that, especially in family law, allow disputes to be arbitrated using religious jurisdictions.

SOMMARIO: 1. Considerazioni introduttive – 2. Luci ed ombre in materia di tolleranza e libertà religiosa – 3. La religione in Nigeria come strumento di integrazione nazionale – 4. Attuazione e inattuazione della libertà religiosa nel contesto sociale – 5. La reintroduzione della Shari’a: un problema aperto – 6. Le “sfide” democratiche.

ABSTRACT: With this essay the Author analyses the characteristics of religious freedom in Nigerian legal system, which is considered part of a wider legal phenomenon, what is called the African legal system. Considering the issues related to the religious attitude of the African peoples, and in particular that of the Nigerian ones, the Author underlines the influence exercised by the various religious creeds on other spheres of public life. Besides, in this context one has to take into account the fact that both traditional cultures and political framework have been deeply influenced by the British colonial power. Finally, in this essay the Author also analyses some aspects concerning the fundamental rights in Nigeria, including the religious rights: the way these rights have been recognised and implemented in Nigerian legal system.

SOMMARIO: 1. Il composito panorama della libertà religiosa in Italia - 2. I segnali delle criticità – 3. Tra confronto e scontro – 4. Il bisogno degli “uomini liberali”.

Avec une certaine obstination contentieuse, un salarié a régulièrement cherché, depuis 1996, à remettre en cause le système de prélèvement à la source de l’impôt cultuel tel qu’il existe en Allemagne. Dans cet Etat, en effet, les employés doivent remettre à leur employeur respectif “une carte d’impôt sur le salaire" sur  laquelle, entre autres informations, figure  “l’appartenance à une Eglise ou une société religieuse habilitée à lever l’impôt cultuel”. Si le salarié use de son droit de refuser le paiement d’un tel impôt, la mention «--» sera portée dans la case dédiée à l’appartenance religieuse. Dès lors, l’employeur ne retiendra pas sur le salaire la fraction correspondant à cet impôt et ne la transmettra pas au Trésor Public. (Continua)
 

SUMMARY: INTRODUCTION: Key Provision – An Indirect Regulation - The Court is Not a Constitutional Court - Judicial Restraint - A Vision of Religious Freedom - Institutional Dimension of Religious Freedom - I. MODELS: No Arbitrary State Interference - State Neutrality and Impartiality - II. COUNTER-MODELS: Islam – Sects.

SOMMARIO: 1. Cos’è il pacchetto sicurezza - 2. Alcune considerazioni preliminari - 3. Il visto per “motivi religiosi” - 4. I Centri di identificazione ed espulsione ed i CARA -5. Il matrimonio degli stranieri.

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione – 2. La rilevanza del fenomeno religioso nei rapporti di lavoro nel diritto dell’Unione europea: dal Trattato di Amsterdam a quello di Lisbona – 3. Religione e rapporto di lavoro prima del Trattato di Amsterdam: tendenza espansiva del principio di eguaglianza e limiti ai diritti di circolazione – 4. La direttiva 2000/78/CE e il divieto di discriminazione per motivi religiosi: conseguenze per le legislazioni statali e per i poteri organizzativi dei datori di lavoro (in particolare, la questione del riposo domenicale e delle festività) – 5. L’art. 4, dir. 2000/78/CE: la deroga in favore delle cd. organizzazioni di tendenza – 6. L’importanza della giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo a fini interpretativi dell’ampiezza della deroga: i casi Vallauri, Obst e Schüths – 7. La garanzia delle libertà collettive (di religione e sindacale) come precondizione indispensabile per l’esercizio dei diritti di libertà individuale: l’“individualismo” esasperato della giurisprudenza europea.