Contenuti per la categoria: European Court of Human Rights

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa - 2. La pregiudiziale belga: causa C-157/15, G4S Secure Solution - 3. La pregiudiziale francese: causa C-188/15, Bougnaoui e ADDH - 4. Le pronunce “gemelle” della Grande Sezione della Corte di giustizia: la sentenza 14 marzo 2017, Achbita, EU:C:2017:203 e la sentenza 14 marzo 2017, Bougnaoui, EU:C:2017:204 - 5. Uno sguardo alla più recente dottrina ecclesiasticistica - 6. La giurisprudenza della Corte Edu: la sentenza Eweida e altri c. Regno Unito del 15 gennaio 2013 (ricorsi nn. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 e 36516/10) - 7. Osservazioni conclusive.

Freedom to express religious beliefs in the workplace: brief notes on the Achbita and Bougnaoui cases

ABSTRACT: This paper seek to address the delicate issue of religious freedom, from a juridical perspective, analyzing the Achbita and Bougnaoui cases and comparing it with the Eweida one. It intends to elaborate some of the key question of the doctrinal debate on the links between the expression of one's religious beliefs and the workplace. Can neutrality be a valid defense against discriminations? To what extent can the religious freedom of the worker be sacrificed in favor of the business freedom? These are just some of the questions that are posed to the interpreter and to the scholar of ecclesiastical law. They require a careful evaluation of the values involved and the search for solutions of high balance and responsibility.

SUMARIO: 1. Introducción - 2. El concepto de educación-enseñanza, vinculado a la libertad religiosa y el pluralismo - 3. El proselitismo o incitación articulada para compartir una opción de vida - 4. El concepto de adoctrinamiento, como conducta lícita e ilícita - 5. Consecuencias jurídicas: la educación y sus parámetros - 6. Consecuencias jurídicas: El proselitismo legítimo y el abusivo o ilícito - 7. Los conflictos del proselitismo en el seno de la familia, según el TEDH - 8. Consecuencias jurídicas: el “adoctrinamiento” en la educación familiar y reglada - 9. El adoctrinamiento en los tipos penales - 10. Conclusiones.

Education, proselytism and indoctrination: profile and legal treatment

ABSTRACT: Nowadays the identity is a big question, and his preservation depends by a great deal on the education, the proselytism and the indoctrination. These three concepts, close and complex, demand a juridical explanation. This study looks for to light up them, in the European and Spanish context, through the legislation and the case-law.

SOMMARIO: 1. Linee di lettura - 2. La guarigione forzata: i fatti di Vilnius - 3. Il percorso giudiziario che conduce alla decisione di Strasburgo - 4. La dissenting opinion: brevi appunti sul metodo -5. Il sofferto cammino della libertà religiosa tra fede, stregoneria e follia - 6. La forza terapeutica della libertà religiosa: “capacità-libertà” di credere e diritto di guarire - 7. La funzione politica della religione in terra lituana: semi di neo-confessionismo - 8. La sfida dell’inclusione dell’altro da sé: scelte etero-spirituali e prudentia iuris.

Religion and healing: religious freedom and the principle of self-determination in matters of mental health (Salus aegroti suprema lex o voluntas aegroti suprema

ABSTRACT: The case before the Court of Strasbourg, projects us into the most sacred and private dimension of the life of the human being: that of religious options. In the present case, a young woman with behavioral disorders, manifested even before joining the group close to the Movement founded by the Indian Master Osho, following undergoes a series of medical treatments obligatory that force her to the suspension of the religious practices to which she usually devotes for her own psychophysical well-being. But according to the opinion of the doctors these practices compromised the applicant's mental health status, representing a serious and ascertained danger. The doctor becoming the promoter of his patient's health, ends up interfering in the personal sphere of the girl's religious sentiment, trying to modify the choices deemed to be non-conforming to tradition and prejudicial to health, without scientific evidence and, exclusively, on basis of presumptions and religious prejudices. The facts give rise to some considerations on the methods and criteria for balancing the protection of the right to health, and self-determination in therapeutic choices, and the exercise of religious freedom in conditions of compromised mental health, and the risk of a reviving confessional in Lithuania.

SOMMARIO: 1. Considerazioni introduttive - 2. L’ordinanza n. 207 del 2018 della Consulta e la rilevanza costituzionale del “bene vita” - 3. L’„assolutezza” del diritto all’autodeterminazione terapeutica e la sua prevalenza sulla “indisponibilità” del diritto alla vita - 4. Il necessario riconoscimento del diritto all’aiuto al suicidio a tutela della visione personale della “dignità” nel morire ... - 5. ... e del divieto di discriminazioni nel darsi la morte attraverso il distacco delle macchine di sostegno vitale - 6. La “laicità” del biodiritto e il governo delle questioni “eticamente sensibili” - 7. L’apparente “neutralità” dell’opzione pro choice e la disciplina giuridica delle scelte di fine vita.

Health Treatments, Right to Self-determination and End-of-life Choices after Constitutional Court Ordinance No. 207/2018

ABSTRACT: The present essay deals with the issue regarding end-of-life choices after Italian Constitutional Court ruling No. 207/2018, which has prefigured, in certain exceptional situations, the partial unconstitutionality of the provision prohibiting aid to suicide (Article 580 of the Italian Criminal Code). The Author stresses that the patient’s right to refuse or interrupt life-saving treatment can be deemed to be protected by the Constitution, while the enactment of a right to assisted suicide into Italian law would require an ethical choice, which should instead be left to the discretionary assessment of the lawmakers.

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa - 2. La Direttiva 2000/78 CE e i casi Egenberger e IR arrivati a Lussemburgo - 3. Autonomia delle chiese e tutela giurisdizionale dei diritti all’interno delle organizzazioni religiosamente orientate. I contenuti criptici delle pronunce di Lussemburgo - 4. Il requisito ideologico nelle organizzazioni di tendenza. Le integrazioni della Corte UE e le riletture in corso da parte confessionale - 5. L’art. 17 TFUE e l’attesa di chiarimenti.

Religious-Ethos Employers between European Directive, national laws and Court of Justice EU

ABSTRACT: This article examines two recent rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Union (cases Egenberger and IR). These are the first rulings on art. 4, par. 2, Directive 2000/78/EC on “occupational activities within churches and other public or private organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief“. On the one hand the author focuses on the passages concerning religious autonomy and jurisdictional protection of rights; on the other hand she highlights the links between the jurisprudence of the two European courts (CJEU and ECHR) and tries to reconcile the statements of the Court of Justice and those of the German constitutional Court on the limits to the autonomy of churches. However, the article highlights how the Court of Justice has not adequately addressed neither the art. 10 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights EU, nor the art. 17 of the TFEU. As regards the ideological requirement set by art. 4, par. 2 of the European Directive, the study focuses on the additions made by the Court of Justice and recalls the reinterpretations of the ideological requirement recently adopted by the Catholic and Evangelical Churches in Germany.

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa − 2. Quadro normativo di riferimento ­− 3. Sulla valenza culturale del crocifisso − 4. Laicità, imparzialità, neutralità dei luoghi pubblici - 5. La rimozione dei crocifissi: una condotta da sanzionare? - 6. Osservazioni conclusive.

Draft law n. 387/18, “Provisions concerning the crucifix exhibition in schools and public administrations”: brief reflections.

ABSTRACT: The draft law n. 387 of March 26, 2018, (obligation to expose the Crucifix in schools and public administrations), is part of a complex legal-constitutional context of relations between state and religious phenomenon, characterized by multiple unresolved issues and problematic profiles. The law refers to the theory of cultural and identity value of the symbol, sustained with continuity by the administrative jurisprudence in disputes concerning the regulations governing the exposure of the crucifix. The questionability of this hermeneutical perspective, largely outdated, is clear and evident if we consider the most current judgments on the subject. The most critical issues of the current proposal will be examined.

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa - 2. La giurisprudenza della Suprema Corte - 3. L’introduzione del § 1631, lett. d, nel BGB tedesco e la giurisprudenza di Colonia - 4. Risoluzioni e raccomandazioni del Consiglio d’Europa - 5. Il recente dibattito islandese - 6. Prospettive per l’Italia: necessità o ultroneità di una legge ad hoc? - 7. Osservazioni conclusive.

Notes on ritual circumcision in Ecclesiastical and Religious Law.

ABSTRACT: This paper deals with the delicate issue of ritual circumcision in Ecclesiastical and Religious Law. After having investigated the etymological origin of the word and reconstructed the history of the practice in question – distinguishing between circumcisions: a) therapeutic or prophylactic, b) ritual, c) cultural or ethnic – the focus is on the jurisprudential orientations of the Italian Court of Cassation. The solution proposed by the judgment of 24 November 2011, n. 43646, is carefully read and compared with the EU's law, the German legislation and the results of the recent Icelandic debate. Nevertheless, the absence of an ad hoc law on circumcision does not represent a vulnus in the Italian legal system, since the discipline can be found in the positive law in force, and even before in constitutional principles, as interpreted by the jurisprudence of merit and legitimacy. On the contrary, the essay raises the question that the introduction of a law on circumcision would not only be superfluous (for ethical and cultural reasons, even before legal ones), but also late".

Son passati quasi trent’anni dacché tra le varie dichiarazioni apposte in calce al trattato di Maastricht comparve abbastanza inaspettatamente quella che impegna l’Unione Europea al “dialogo trasparente, costante e regolare” con “le chiese e le associazioni o comunità religiose” non più e non meno, tuttavia, che con le “organizzazioni filosofiche e non confessionali”. Dichiarazione apparentemente innocua, giacché espressamente si esclude che da essa possa essere pregiudicato lo status a quelle organizzazioni assegnato dai diritti nazionali, ma politicamente impegnativa per l’Unione, tanto che fece strada e si riversò nell’art. 17 del TFUE, assumendo così un carattere anche giuridicamente impegnativo. (segue)

Non-believer’s Europe

ABSTRACT: In spite of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which puts on the same footing the status of the churches and of the humanist organizations, the status  of believers and non-believers is not the same in each state, regardless its model (the paper quotes briefly the features of United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Italy, Germany  and Malta). The reason lies in a kind of mass religious tradition, which at present is even more hard to defeat because of the rampant populism, which takes advantage also of the religion. The antidote stays in the pluralistic – not monist and excluding the differences -  secularism in order to grant the same dignity of believers also to both differently believers and non-believers.

Il 28 settembre 2018, presso l’Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, si è tenuto un convegno internazionale co-finanziato dall’Unione Europea, che ha visto la partecipazione di giovani studiosi delle più diverse discipline giuridiche, italiani e stranieri. I relatori, selezionati in seguito ad una “call for papers”, cui è stata data ampia pubblicità in Italia e all’estero, si sono confrontati sul tema del pluralismo religioso nel sistema europeo e, soprattutto, nella recente giurisprudenza delle Corti sovranazionali. (continua)

SUMMARY: 1. Introduction - 2. The meaning of State neutrality: some conceptual clarifications - 3. State’s neutrality vis-à-vis religious organizations: neutrality as absence of interference - 4. State’s neutrality vis-à-vis public education: neutrality as objectivity - 5. State neutrality vis-à-vis religious symbols in the public sphere: neutrality as exclusion of religion - 6. ‘Reversed’ patters of neutrality: the disruptive effect of Lautsi v. Italy - 7. Concluding remarks: decoding the patterns of State neutrality in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.

ABSTRACT: This contribution discusses the notion of State neutrality in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. State neutrality has become increasingly relevant in the rulings of the ECtHR concerning religious freedom, with the Court explicitly resorting to the idea that States should act as neutral and impartial organizers of religious life within their community. Yet, the conception of State neutrality developed by the Court is inconsistent and often gives rise to criticism. By exploring the Court’s main jurisprudence in the context of religious disputes, religious education in public education, and the display of religious symbols in public spaces, this contribution seeks to disentangle the different understandings of neutrality employed by the Court and to critically engage with them.