SOMMARIO: 1. Per superare la polisemia del termine “laicità” - 2. Cenni sulla dottrina cattolica in tema di laicità - 3. Una aggettivazione risalente: la “sana” laicità - 4. Le più moderne espressioni della “laicità positiva” - 5. Note conclusive.
SOMMARIO: 1. La posizione del Presidente della Repubblica Giorgio Napolitano - 2. Laicismo e anticlericalismo - 3. Un’auspicabile prospettiva circa la laicità.
ABSTRACT: An event that has sparked discussions on neutrality and assumed centrality in the debate on the public dimension of the religious factor is related to the non-participation of Benedict XVI at the inauguration of the academic year at the University of Rome "La Sapienza", scheduled for January 17, 2008. In its judgment no. 203/1989, the Constitutional Court stated that neutrality "does not imply indifference to religion but the state guarantee for the protection of freedom of religion, under the religious and cultural pluralism." The debate on the issue of the University "La Sapienza" has fueled confusion about the meaning of the word to make the invisible boundary between neutrality, laicism and anti-clericalism. Decisive contribution to the construction of some carefully sentinels, among which there are those who have authoritatively explained that neutrality is to be understood: "... not as an attitude of estrangement, indifference or hostility of the state and its elites, with respect to the religious consciousness of the people, under the confessional pluralism, atheism is not excluded, but the protection of the equal freedom of all faiths (...) The true neutrality and the true faith are made to compete fairly in the conduct man to the full meaning of the days that are given to live".
SOMMARIO: 1. Laicità e dualità del potere – 2. Geopolitica della laicità, suoi significati – 3. L'elemento popolare – 4. Il ruolo del civis-fidelis della tradizione classica nei regimi democratici - 5. Distinzione degli ordini e neutralità religiosa.
Four Annotations Concerning the Principle of Secularism (laicità): General Conclusions
ABSTRACT: Both at national and international level, the lowest common denominator of various principles of secularization (in French laïcité) is the separation - distinction between State law and religious law, which includes the distinction between different assignments of these two spheres. That is in reality the central-essential aspect of the principle of secularization, which also represents the solid ground for every normative models as well as geographic horizon in what is called the Western legal system. One could identify the historical roots of that principle in a specific period – that lasted form the I to IV centuries – from which the “sinfonia” (symphony) between sacerdotium and imperium developed (especially until the 1054 a.C.). Given these roots, from time to time the concrete life of nations and their laws have been able to affirm the famous conceptions – we all know – identifying the crucial characteristics of secularization. And this also gives us the solid basis for understanding the future conceptions of secularization. Nowadays, in the context of European Union the religious nomoi groups, the philosophical organizations as well as all human categories (like women) – that in the past era were subjected to gender and racial discriminations – hold the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; which includes freedom to change religion or belief . In this sense, we may identify an “European principle of secularization”, also understanding its evolution.
SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa - 2. I Concordati del primo novecento: definizione dei tratti tipici del modello – 3. La revisione concordataria del secondo dopoguerra: libertà di scelta educativa e pluralismo religioso - 4. L’istruzione religiosa “nell’ambito delle finalità della scuola”. Il caso Italia - 5. (segue) … l’esperienza di Spagna e Portogallo.
SOMMARIO: 1. Il significato dell’espressione – 2. Il rifiuto del compromesso – 3. La distinzione fra principi e valori.
ABSTRACT: The expression “not negotiable principles”, related for the Catholic Church to categorys of the natural right, induces to reflect about the meaning which the refusal of mediation and the difference between principles and valours have in a democratic system.
SOMMARIO: 1. L’insperato recupero di alcune intese - 2. Le novità degne di nota - 3. Osservazioni conclusive.
SOMMARIO: 1. Limits to free speech, incitement to hatred and a “third case” - 2. UN Resolutions on Defamation of Religions (1999 – 2010). The role of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation - 3. Recognizing values and rights in the defamation of religions discourse - 4. The interplay between racial and religious offences and its effect on limitations to free speech - 5. Balancing freedom of expression and freedom of religion in the work of the UN Human Rights Committee - 6. Concluding Remarks.
Freedom of religion, freedom of expression and the United Nations: recognizing values and rights in the “defamation of religions” discourse
ABSTRACT: The article focuses on the issue of religious freedom and freedom of expression from the point of view of the United Nations. In particular, it examines the so called Defamation of religions, which has been the topic of a series of Resolutions voted by the Human Rights Commission, the Human Rights Council and the Assembly General, from 1999 to 2010. In the Defamation of religions debate, the UN institutions appear to tend to highlight the conflict between rights rather than the positive interrelation between them. Nonetheless, it has been repeatedly argued that it should be possible for political institutions and religious majorities to use anti-defamatory legislation in order to stem the activities of religious minorities. Applying penal anti-defamation laws might not be the best way to deal with the potential conflict between two fundamental rights. The more recent trends show a shift toward what seems to be a more suitable accommodation of the interests at stake. In this regard, the article will consider the Human Rights Council’s Resolution about discrimination on religious grounds (2011), the Ad Hoc Committee on Complementary Standards to the ICERD and the new General Comment on article 19 of the ICCPR.
SOMMARIO: 1. Considerazioni introduttive – 2. I precedenti – 3. Le previsioni della legge 12 giugno 2001, n. 2001-504 – 4. Cenni alle reazioni sovranazionali e internazionali – 5. La successiva attività governativa e parlamentare – 6. Conclusioni interlocutorie guardando all’apporto giurisprudenziale.
SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa - 2. L’istruzione popolare in Inghilterra: dal sostegno alle scuole confessionali alla riforma Gladstone - 3. La scuola confessionale nel sistema di pubblica istruzione: dalla riforma Gladstone ai nostri giorni. - 4. Il separatismo americano: le ragioni di una scelta e la sua incidenza sul sistema scolastico. - 5. Scuola confessionale ed establishment clause. La fase di strict separation. – 6. (segue) L’affermazione di un separatismo attenuato. I voucher e le charter schools.
SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa: alle origini del dibattito attuale - 2. La giurisprudenza della CEDU sui simboli religiosi - 3. La sentenza Lautsi e la sua ratio decidendi: a) Il crocifisso come simbolo passivo - 4. (segue) b) Il margine di apprezzamento dello Stato e le tradizioni nazionali - 5. (segue) c) La garanzia di un contesto pluralista e l’evoluzione del principio di laicità - 6. Gli effetti della sentenza Lautsi sulla giurisprudenza della CEDU - 7. Gli effetti della sentenza Lautsi in Europa. a) Francia. b) Turchia. c) Germania. d) Paesi di tradizione ortodossa. e) Spagna - 8. Il caso italiano e il ruolo dello Stato nel sostegno ai simboli religiosi della tradizione - 9. La soluzione legislativa: pro e contro - 10. Osservazioni conclusive.
ABSTRACT: This paper examines the issue of religious symbols in the public spaces in the recent European experience. After some preliminary remarks about the origins of the present debate, comparing the American and European religious models, it focuses on the line of decisions of the ECHR in matters of religious symbols. In particular it takes the contents of the Lautsi judgement (2011) into consideration and evaluates its possible effects on the future decisions of the ECHR and of national courts of European countries like France, Turkey, Germany, countries of Orthodox tradition and Spain. In the end it makes some conclusive remarks about the Italian case and the role of the State in supporting the religious symbols of the tradition, examining the advantages and disadvantages of the legislative solution.