Contenuti per la categoria: Laicità e pluralismo

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa. La morte di Piero Calamandrei (27 settembre 1956) e il suo funerale - 2. L’oggetto del giudizio della Corte costituzionale. La sentenza della Corte costituzionale del n. 1 del 23 aprile 1956 - 3. 7 aprile 1957 : la relazione di Paolo Barile nel convegno degli Amici del Mondo su Stato e Chiesa in Italia al teatro Eliseo di Roma - 4. Le sentenze della Corte costituzionale nn. 30, 31 e 32 del 1971: il parametro della tutela dei principi supremi dell’ordinamento costituzionale italiano. Il principio costituzionale di eguaglianza non è un principio supremo dell’ordinamento costituzionale? - 5. Il convegno di Siena dal 30 novembre al 2 dicembre 1972. Due mondi diversi? - 6. La sentenza n. 195 del 1972 sul caso Cordero. Professori delle università cattoliche senza garanzie di rispetto della loro libertà di insegnamento? - 7. La sentenza n. 18 del 1982: un giudice e un giudizio pur sempre ci sono (?) - 8. La sentenza n. 203 del 1989. Insegnamenti diversi per bambini e ragazzi “credenti” cattolici e “non credenti”? - 9. Fu vera gloria? No, essa fu accolta in una parte del mondo della scuola con la dolorosa sensazione che si prova quando si è vittima di un inganno.

Cunning and ambiguity in constitutional jurisprudence on religious matters

ABSTRACT: A journey to Florence for the funeral of Piero Calamandrei (September 27, 1956). A project for a secular and democratic Italy: dreams, hopes, illusions and disappointments. Religion jurisprudence in the decisions of the Constitutional Court no. 1 of 1956, 30, 31 and 32 of 1971, 195 of 1972, 18 of 182, 203 of 1989. The judicial remedy in school matters and the academic disappointment for a constitutional decision that introduced the supreme principle of secularism but at the same time confirmed as compliant to the Constitution the coexistence, in public schools, of separate classes for believers (in the catholic religion) and nonbelievers.

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa: la pronuncia della Corte costituzionale e i nodi da sciogliere - 2. I limiti legittimi alla libertà religiosa - 3. Gli interventi positivi a favore del diritto al culto - 4. Brevi considerazioni conclusive: che cosa farà (o, meglio, cosa dovrebbe fare) il legislatore regionale?

The Constitutional Court’s position about worship facilities between limits against the freedom of religion and positive interventions

ABSTRACT: The Constitutional Court has another time pronounced about the right to have a place of worship. Its statements are crucial for this subject and are likely to produce an echo even outside the field of worship facilities. In particular, the Court affirms, on the one hand, that the freedom of worship might be limited only in order to guarantee concrete opposing interests, and not for mere exigencies of control. On the other hand, the Court declares that the freedom of religion, given its central and essential position in the Constitution, legitimizes and requires positive interventions by the legislator, in order to be promoted.

SOMMARIO: 1. L’intesa con l’Associazione Chiesa d’Inghilterra - 2. L’assenza di una legge generale nel periodo liberale - 3. La Conciliazione - 4. Il permanere dell’assenza di una legge comune - 5. Continuità e innovazione dopo il 1948 - 6. La mancata revisione della legge sui culti - 7. La polemica anticoncordataria - 8. Il progetto di una legge generale sulla libertà religiosa - 9. Un’unica legge per esigenze diverse - 10. La legge comune sul “fatto” religioso - 11. Il potenziale conflitto con le leggi di derivazione pattizia - 12. Uguaglianza e discriminazione - 13. Sulla possibile rilevanza dei diritti religiosi - 14. Sul rilievo di alcune minoranze - 15. Conclusioni.

The law on accepted cults, the agreements and the need for a common regulation on the religious issue

ABSTRACT: Taking the cue from the signing of the agreement with the association Chiesa d’Inghiterra, we note thelack of a common regulation not on religous freedom, which is protected by the rules of the Italian Constitution through directly effective regulations, and which could be invasive and inadequate, but of a common basic regulation on religion, such that in goes beyond the old law on accepted cults and equates, as far as possible, the condition of churches with an agreement with those that do not have one. The viewpoint of the bilaterally contracted law, inherited from and confirmed by the pre-Repubblican period, while meeting the needs of cults, is not able to ensure a certain uniformity of treatment for all denominations, i.e. it cannot be applied also to those cults that have not negotiated it, that do not want or cannot do so. What is lacking in a unilateral law of the State, which outlines the essential and common points, that is the basis and reference index for other laws, given that equality does not mean the same things and that differentiations are allowed, or rather imposed, as long as they are not arbitrary. Besides, there is the problem of religius instances referring to secular and profane aspects of the human person, which can be inserted into the formative process of the law, allowing for to norms, which in religiously motivated subjects receive a further compelling force. It is responsibility of a pluralist and secular State, aware and guarantor of its own values and indispensable rules, to supervise the process of synthesis of the different cultures.

SOMMARIO: 1. Interventi legislativi della Regione Lombardia sui luoghi di culto - 2. La sentenza della Corte costituzionale n. 504 del 2019 sulla l.r. Lombardia del 2005 - 3. Pianificazione urbanistica secondaria e politiche regionali - 4. Considerazioni conclusive.

The so-called "anti-mosque" legislation between governance policies and protection of religious freedom

ABSTRACT: A recent intervention by the Constitutional Court of 2019 continued in the path intended to dismantle the Lombard legislation, also known as the "anti mosque" law, underlining the danger of a federalism, producing a growing fragmentation in a matter of such delicate constitutional relevance. The Court has currently canceled the obligation to regulate, through a Plan for religious equipment (PAR), the opening of any place of worship and the need to associate this Plan with the PGT (Territorial Government Plan). A territorial governance project, in fact, from the point of view of urban planning, must include the legal discipline of social religiosity, contextualising this intervention with the need for a structuring of aggregation spaces, open to all religious and secular bodies, concretely present in the social fabric. The construction of buildings intended for religious worship or, as more recently defined, of "equipment of common interest for religious purposes" is a matter by its nature suspended between the protection of religious freedom - even in its expression of collective law - and the legislation urbanism.

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione - 2. Simboli religiosi e sfera pubblica - 3. Il ruolo della giurisprudenza e il difficile rapporto con l’Islam - 4. Il porto di simboli religiosi nel contesto giudiziario - 5. Le pronunzie Hamidović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina e Lachiri v. Belgium - 6. Presenza o no di una base normativa che valga a giustificare la restrizione della libertà religiosa - 7. La tensione fra il test di proporzionalità e il margine di apprezzamento - 8. La connessione fra posizione individuale e istituzione pubblica …- a) … nel caso Hamidović - b) … nel caso Lachiri - 9. Disamina breve delle pronunzie in materia di porto di simboli e della loro ratio - 10. L’analisi del limite “dei diritti e delle libertà altrui” - 11. Una svolta a favore delle minoranze? - 12. La questione irrisolta di forme religiosamente motivate di face covering in ambito europeo - 13. L’uso di abbigliamento religiosamente caratterizzato nell’ambito delle aule giudiziarie in Canada: l’opinione di maggioranza nella pronunzia R. v. NS. - 14. La concurring opinion del giudice LeBel - 15. La dissenting opinion del giudice Abella - 16. Le potenziali ricadute della pronunzia canadese sulla libertà religiosa individuale e su quella del gruppo di appartenenza - 17. La giurisprudenza canadese successiva - 18. Il porto di simboli religiosi nelle aule giudiziarie negli U.S.A. – 19. Il porto del niqab nelle aule giudiziarie negli U.S.A. - 20. La questione del niqab nelle aule giudiziarie in Australia - 21. Le corti e le minoranze: un tentativo di comparazione fra la giurisprudenza dei giudici extraeuropei di common law … - 22. … e la giurisprudenza della Corte europea - 23. Lo strumento dell’„accomodamento ragionevole” negli ordinamenti extraeuropei di common law - 24. La possibilità del “trapianto” dell’accomodamento ragionevole in ambito comunitario. Il caso Eweida - 25. La conciliabilità del parametro dell’accomodamento ragionevole con gli standard della Corte europea - 26. La garanzia di propozionalità in ambito europeo e i suoi limiti - 27. Il limite del margine di apprezzamento - 28. La necessità di un più rigoroso bilanciamento fra margine di apprezzamento e principio di proporzionalità - 29 Le potenzialità del “ragionevole accomodamento” nell’ambito convenzionale europeo - 30. Una valutazione comparativa del rapporto fra libertà di espressione religiosa “privata” e spazio “pubblico” - 31. La libertà di manifestazione religiosa dei privati nelle aule giudiziarie … - a) … in ambito europeo - b) ... in ambito extraeuropeo - 32) Annotazioni riepilogative.

Religious Garb in the Courtroom

ABSTRACT: The present essay analyses the crucial issue of the freedom to wear religious garments in the courtroom. It provides a comparative survey of European, U.S., Canadian and Australian case law, investigating how they are facing the question concerning the place of religious expression in the public square, and taking into consideration different legal frameworks and their recent developments.

SUMARIO: 1. Introducción - 2. El significado esencial de las cláusulas religiosas de la Primera enmienda de la Constitución federal - 3. El argumento de la tradición histórica en la interpretación judicial de la Establishment Clause - 4. La tradición histórica como excepción a la aplicabilidad de los normales parámetros jurídicos de validez en materia de aconfesionalidad.

The Supreme Court of the United States and the use or historical tradition in Establishment Clause jurisprudence

ABSTRACT: This paper deals with the study of the use of history and tradition that has been made by the Supreme Court of the United States when deciding certain cases concerning the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. It explores the way in which, when confronted with certain practices that are in appearance clearly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause, sometimes the Supreme Court has simply ignored the different tests commonly settled for constitutional adjudication in this particular field such as the Lemon test, and has relied on historical tradition as the governing principle for that purpose. This circumstance leading to the setting of a controversial carve-out in Establishment Clause adjudication that might be better explained as a result of politics and political and social pressures rather than as a product of principled constitutional interpretation.

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione - 2. Linguaggio, discorso e ragione - 3. Linguaggio ordinario e linguaggi esperti - 4. Linguaggio e sfera pubblica - 5. La teoria del discorso e le tradizioni religiose: alcuni cenni sul pensiero di Habermas - 6. Il fondamentalismo religioso - 7. La “traduzione neutralizzante” - 8. Conclusioni.

Religion and public sphere in Jürgen Habermas’s discoursive theory

ABSTRACT: The relationship between religion and the public sphere, from the perspective of Habermas's theory of discourse, gives a glimpse of the possibility of a shared space, reflected in democratic decision-making procedures, which has priority over every strategic and self-referential representation of the social. The "linguisticization of the sacred" process has gradually led the author to free the theory of modernity from a rigid theory of secularization; on the other hand, the religious phenomenon, freed from obsolete dogmatisms, reveals itself as the bearer of a procedural rationality capable of operating in everyday communication practice. In this dialogic path, which is anything but linear, Habermas' communicative reason seeks to find solutions capable of safeguarding both religious dimensions and the legacy of Enlightenment thought. This, first of all, to stem the monological drift of particularistic global interests able to endorse, even in sectors of a public nature, dynamics typical of strategic-functional action that lead to the restriction of the common space and to the loss of effectiveness of the institutions traditionally deputies for the democratic representation of interests. At the resolution of these questions, the discursive reason does not offer a single answer but indicates a path of learning and constructive conciliation of the visions of the world.

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa - 2. Brevi cenni all’impianto del Codice Rocco - 3. La novella del 2006 e la tutela delle confessioni religiose - 4. La giurisprudenza successiva alla novella: il caso Oliviero Toscani.

The protection of religious confessions under current criminal law: the Oliviero Toscani case

ABSTRACT: By the law n 85/2006 the Italian legislator modified criminal law provisions intended to protect collective religious feelings (art 402-406 criminal law code). In particular the new law has not confirmed old art 402 of the criminal law code, which provided for the generic crime of blasphemy. Insofar as the latter crime was characterised for its broad definition and scope, it raised serious questions of consistency with Art 21 of the Italian Constitution. However, the modifications introduced with law 85/2006 have been interpreted so leniently in subsequent case law that the old art 402 has been re-introduced as a matter of fact.

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione - 2. I precedenti giurisprudenziali - 3. Un nuovo ruolo per i giudici tunisini? - 4. La tutela dei diritti e delle libertà: tra comparazione e fiqh - 5. Profili comparatistici. Il processo di rettifica del genere in una pronuncia della Corte d’appello di Beirut - 6. Considerazioni conclusive.

A landmark decision concerning gender rectification in Tunisia: the right to a private life between comparative law, international law and fiqh

ABSTRACT: The decision of the Tribunal of Tunis, concerning gender rectification in public registries of a transgender FtM person who underwent sex reassignment treatment, is an example of innovative case law. The judgment, changing the previous case law, is characterized by the use of the comparative method, so that, in the grounds for ruling, legal principles from different foreign jurisdictions and the fiqh coexist. Specifically, the Tribunal of Tunis, showing an open and dialogical approach to other jurisdictions and legislations of the globe, has consecrated the fundamental human right of gender rectification in public registries, rarely recognized in other Arab countries.

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa - 2. La procedura costituzionale - 3. Il diritto penale - 4. I principî: a) la dignità … - 5. (segue) b) la coscienza … - 6. (segue) c) la separazione (ovvero la laicità).

Presented uncostitutionality and justifiable assisted suicide: innovations in continuity

ABSTRACT: For the first time the Italian Constitutional Court adopted a double ruling (anticipatory the one, deciding the other) in the same judicial review. And for the first time also elaborated the circumstances of a justifiable (doctor-) assisted suicide, that so far was in any case a crime. They are two outstanding jurisprudential innovations, however the aim of the Author is to demonstrate that they are not in break but in continuity with the decision techniques of the Court, on one hand, and the leading cases on the topic of criminal justifications, on the other hand. Particularly the concept of subjective dignity, that according to the Court is the reason behind the decision of the patient, is recurring in the precedents of the Court of Cassation. Generally, moreover, the concepts of conscience, life and death prevail on this matter, neverthless are differently interpreted according to an ethic, specially religious, perspective or a secular, specially state, perspective. The merit of the decision consists precisely of the separatist, secular planning between ethics and law.