Contenuti per la categoria: Diritto ecclesiastico (Teoria generale del)

SOMMARIO: 1. Giurisprudenza e dottrina prima della sentenza - 2. La sentenza: l’insegnamento di religione cattolica e la laicità - 3. Benefici e costi del “nuovo” principio supremo - 4. La quiete dopo la sentenza - 5. Lo “sgonfiamento” del principio supremo - 6. La recezione della laicità.

Thirty years of Secularism (rereading Italian Constitutional Court 1989/203 and the subsequent Constitutional Jurisprudence)

ABSTRACT: The paper rereads at a distance of thirty years the italian leading case about the secularism and findes its underutilization as highest principle, in favour of the “ordinary” principles of equality and freedom of religion, and its not large, at times unnamed, reception in the jurisprudence.

SOMMARIO: 1. Premessa - 2. 1990-2020: trent’anni di progetti per una legge generale sulla libertà religiosa - 3. Norme sulla libertà religiosa e laicità: indicazioni per un’indagine - 4. Quale laicità nei progetti di legge? - 5. Le leggi sulla laicità: alcuni esempi, molte suggestioni, qualche dubbio - 6 Nessuna nuova. Cattiva nuova.

Secularism and drafts law on Religious Freedom

ABSTRACT: This paper focuses the attention on the drafts law on Religious Freedom and aims to examine the links between Secularism and Freedom of Religion.

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione - 2. Libertà di culto e pandemia - 3. Logica deontica e bilancia costituzionale - 4. Le critiche agli interventi governativi - 5. Logica giuscostituzionale - 6. Libertas ecclesiae e pandemia - 7. Conclusioni e prospettive.

Constitution and Religion in Italy in a Time of Pandemic

ABSTRACT: In the first half of 2020, in Italy the coronavirus (Covid-19) has spread quickly, putting the country in an unprecedented emergency. From here stemmed the Government’s measures, which were (and are) without parallel in the history of the Italian State. These measures have led to an animated debate, especially when associated to the limitations imposed on the public liturgical life of the Catholic Church. That was also incorporated into the discussion concerning the long-standing principle-method of bilateralism, as established in Articles 7.2 and 8.3 of the Italian Constitution. With this article the Author analyses this debate in the light of the constitutional duty to protect human health, in the individual and collective sense of the terms.

SOMMARIO: 1. Le restrizioni introdotte dalla normativa ‘emergenziale’ - 2. La legittimità delle restrizioni sotto il profilo del bilanciamento tra interessi - 3. (segue) e del rispetto del principio pattizio - 4. I protocolli per la ripresa delle funzioni religiose come strumenti di ‘responsabile’ collaborazione - 5. I profili di criticità - 6. Conclusioni.

The Limits to the Practice of Worship during the Health Emergency and the ‘Responsible’ Collaboration with the Religious Denominations

ABSTRACT: The severe pandemic which has affected the Italian country (as well as the rest of the world) led the Government to introduce restrictive measures whose aim was to hinder the diffusion of the virus. Such measures imposed a general prohibition to any movements and gatherings, thus affecting the exercise of many fundamental rights and, among these, the freedom of worship, considered in its interpersonal dimension. In particular, as far as this right was concerned, the legitimacy of its restriction had to be assessed not only in the light of its balance with other competing interests (namely, public health), but even of the constitutional principle which compels the State to regulate its relationships with the religious denominations on the base of agreements signed whith their representatives (art. 7, c. 2, and 8, c. 3, Cost.). For these reasons, some scholars criticized the unilateral nature of the restrictive measures, whilst they welcomed favorably the signing of the ‘health protocols’ adopted in order to restart the celebration of public worship ceremonies. This paper aims at assessing whether a unilateral limitation of the freedom of worship might be considered legitimate. In addition, it is going to investigate the juridical nature of the abovementioned health protocols, in order to highlight any critical profiles.

SOMMARIO: 1. La figura del “reato culturalmente motivato” e l’idea di multiculturalismo - 2. L’eterogeneità della categoria dei reati culturalmente motivati. Il principio di offensività come canone ermeneutico e veicolo di un approccio interdisciplinare - 3. Il “porto” del kirpan: l’approccio ‘fonografico’ del giudice di legittimità nell’ordinamento italiano - 4. La reasonable accomodation nell’interpretazione pluralista della Corte Suprema Canadese attraverso il caso Multani. Spunti per una comparazione - 5. L’„accomodation” alla prova del paradigma sicuritario. La vicenda del riconoscimento della personalità giuridica della comunità sikh in Italia.

Rethinking the antinomy of the cultural offence. Hypotheses from a legal-philosophical perspective

ABSTRACT: The essay is intends to problematize the epistemological perspective which, in the Italian system, upholds the judicial interpretation related to the cases that can be ascribed to the category of the so-called cultural offence. In this regard, t he article is focused on the case-law concerning the religious practices of the sikh believer and on the legal recognition affair of Sikhism in Italy, identifying this empirical field as a privileged observatory. The topic of the analysis, through the Canadian approach, makes it possible to assess the canons of the prevailing hermeneutics in matter and to envisage hypotheses toward a rethinking of the theoretical assumptions underlying the criminal law enforcement, especially considering non offensive conduct of a religious nature.

SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione - 2. Riservatezza psichica, profilazione e neurotecnologie - 3. Il valore della riservatezza psichica - 4. Privacy e libertà di pensiero.

Psychoprivacy: Some Remarks on the Relation between Protection of Personal Data and Freedom of Thought

ABSTRACT: This essay maintains that the same normative reasons that lead to ascribe to individuals a fundamental right to privacy imply a fortiori a certain degree of legal protection against the unwanted detection and disclosure of their ideas, beliefs, opinions, preferences, tastes, feelings, moods, dispositions, memories, aspirations, action plans and other conscious or unconscious products of their mind. This aspect of the right to privacy referred to the mental (cognitive, doxastic, intentional, mnemonic and emotional) dimension of individuals will be called psychoprivacy and examined in its relationship with freedom of thought. It will be concluded that the psychoprivacy of individuals conflicts with freedom of thought only if the latter is considered from the perspective of the speaking subject, that is, the one who claims the freedom to express their thoughts without any legal restrictions whatsoever. If, on the other hand, freedom of thought is centered on the thinking subject, and understood as the right to cultivate one's thoughts and purposes regardless of any expression or translation in practice, then there is no conflict with psychoprivacy, but rather harmony.

SOMMARIO: 1. Breve storia di un storia lunga - 2. La teologia giuridica di Hans Kelsen - 3. La teologia politica di Carl Schmitt - 4. Intermezzo - 5. Il lascito di Schmitt - 6. Il dito e la luna - 7. La religione del valore di Ronald Dworkin - 8. Una conclusione, … per iniziare.

Glory and misery about political theology

ABSTRACT. This paper deals with the interactions between religions and law. In particular, it analyses and discusses Kelsen’s, Schmitt’s, and Dworkin’s theories on legal and/or political theology. Although in different ways, these authors have well perceived a large number of links between religion and law; nevertheless their conceptions about religion are narrow and remains strictly Christian-centred. A wider concept of religion - as it has been conceptualized by anthropological and social studies - could reveals how many religious concepts underlie legal systems all over the world, and how much (Christian) religion is masked even in western secular law and institutions.

Summary: 1. Introduction - 2. Italian legal responses to COVID-19: the Italian constitutional and legal framework on religious freedom - 3. The suspension of religious assemblies during phase one of the pandemic - 4. A “cautious resumption” of religious gatherings during the phase two in Italy - 5. U.S. legal responses to COVID-19: U.S. constitutional and legal framework about religious freedom - 6. The legal patchwork because of the pandemic - 7. Judicial balance between individual liberties and the preservation of health - 8. Litigation in lower courts about the exercise of religious freedom during Covid-19 - 9 New creative ways of worshipping in Covid-19 times: drive-in religious services - 10. Third-party burdens and the successful nondiscrimination approach - 11. Department of Justice statements - 12 Supreme Court intervention in temporary state restrictions on religious assemblies - 13. “Religious America” and “secular” Italy during Covid-19 phase one - 14. Management of religious freedom during the pandemic and the lack or presence of a statute governing religious freedom - 15. Effect of the pandemic on the question of whose religious freedom should be protected - 16. Guaranteeing a fair level of religious accommodation during a pandemic - 17. Enhanced need to balance the exercise of religious freedom with third-party harm during a pandemic - 18. Impact of the pandemic on the exercise of religious freedom in the long term.

ABSTRACT: The so-called lockdown, imposed to restrain (or at least limit) the spread of COVID-19, has, in the over four seemingly endless months since it started, had an overwhelming impact not only on our personal lives, but also on domestic regulatory frameworks. Legal systems responded individually, and with differences to the pandemic emergency, ranging from a complete interruption of the collective exercise of religious worship (Italy), to a more cautious recognition of forms of religious accommodation (United States). The present paper compares the impact of COVID-19 restrictions on the exercise of religious freedom in the United States and the Italian legal contexts, and investigates how the pandemic crisis emphasized underlying judicial, political, sociocultural, and economic challenges, giving rise to a tension between competing rights and exacerbating concerns about the “special” role of religion. As the COVID situation is changing so rapidly in the United States, in Italy, and around the world, I clarify that the information in the present paper relates at the situation as at the end of June 2020.

SUMMARY: 1. Scholar challenges and epistemological pitfalls - 2. Traditional Muslim hermeneutics and the development of schools of Jurisprudence - 3. Jurist’s authority and ruler’s governance from a comparative perspective - 4. Muslim legal tradition of plural jurisdictions - 5. The open scholar question of reciprocal legal influences with other juridical systems - 6. Conclusive remarks.

ABSTRACT: This article analyzes several open scholar debates regarding the Muslim legal system, from the conventional narrative of its formation and the triumph of the Traditionalist movement to the disputed question of reciprocal legal influences with other religious and secular juridical systems. This research tries to avoid two epistemological risks: first, the dangers of a simplistic binary debate like traditionalists v. revisionists, religious v. secular, or even Sunnis v. Shiite reducing the analysis to an ideologically polarized and ineffective dispute; and second, the improper use of juridical neologisms applied to the Islamic legal system, mainly from codified European continental law and English common law as a result of the Orientalist, colonialist, and secularist mentalities that, instead clarification create confusion. From a hermeneutical point of view, two characteristics to keep in mind: 1) the notion of divine law and its legal implications; and 2) the relationship between law and theology that is not correlative to the connection between secular legislation and ideology. From a comparative point of view, three challenging questions to address: 1) the distinction between Usul al-fiqh and Usul al-qanun often blurred in practice showing the complexities of the relationship among religious, legal, and political structures under Muslim ruling; 2) the intertwined relationship among Sharia, fiqh, and siyasa with pre-Islamic administrative, legal, and judicial traditions; 3) Jurisdictional pluralism in the Islamic legal practice concerning non-Muslim minorities.

SOMMARIO: 1. La bilateralità “necessaria” e i suoi limiti - 2. Le intese apicali e il generale regime di libertà religiosa - 3. Le intese paraconcordatarie e la delegificazione - 4. La bilateralità “diffusa” e le intese ulteriori - 5. Le differenti bilateralità: una questione di metodo?

The "new agreements" State - religious denominations between necessary bilateralism and broad bilateralism

ABSTRACT: The paper analyzes the system of sources of Italian ecclesiastical law in its two pillars of agreed rules and unilateral rules. The former are necessarily the result of an agreement between different legal systems because they govern the specific relations between the State and individual religious denominations, that is, between sovereign and autonomous entities in their respective orders. The unilateral rules, on the other hand, fall under State jurisdiction because they aim to regulate rights and procedures relating to the generic freedom of conscience of believers, non-believers and other believers. Nevertheless, even in this second area, bilateralism between the State and ethical-religious groups is increasingly being practiced. However, this must not strictly condition State autonomy in the political order, but must aim to enhance the democratic tool of dialogue, as broad as possible, between institutions and intermediate bodies. The two forms of bilateralism (the necessary one and the broad one) are in fact structured within the processes which grant ethical-religious issues varied legal forms and give rise to different types of sources. It is essential that institutional practice does not artfully confuse the two described "bilateralisms", ending up surreptitiously managing all the heterogeneous and plural ethical-religious factor through a single, heavy and comfortable, bureaucratic method based on mere political discretionality.